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A. Introduction 
 
When the true scale of what would later be called ‘crimes against humanity’, 
‘genocide’ and, specifically, ‘the Holocaust’ became clear in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, a number of questions were raised. First, is this a new type of 
crime, in which evil manifests itself in a radically different way than it had earlier? 
Some disputed this. Evil exists at all times and it has always confronted people with 
an abyss of atrocities. With Rawls, one might then say that every ‘great evil’ is 
sufficient in itself and that making comparisons is not necessary, even if the 
Holocaust cannot be detached from earlier ravages of evil such as the Inquisition 
and antisemitism.1 Others thought this question ought to be answered positively. 
Adorno and Levinas formulated their philosophies in part as a response to the 
unique character of the Holocaust. Even now, more than a half a century later, the 
events associated with the Holocaust form a rich source for public debate, scientific 
inquiry and literary expression.2 Secondly, the question has been raised as to how 
one is to cope with this modern form of political evil and with a new type of 
criminal offender. Some argued in favour of the familiar recourse to politics and 
international law. Specifically, political crimes ought either to be dealt with 
politically or to be considered in the light of the principle of international law: par in 
parem non habet jurisdictionem. So, ordinary criminal law is not applicable where the 
mutual conduct of states is concerned. Others, however, including the Allied 
governments in the period immediately following the termination of hostilities, 
                                                 
 * I owe special thanks to Bert van Roermund (Tilburg), Stanley Paulson (Kiel), Christian Joerges and 
Morag Goodwin (Florence). 
 1 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 22 (1999). See, also, his POLITICAL LIBERALISM lxii (2nd ED., 1996). 
 2 Some examples: the (ongoing) discussions on the Holocaust monument in Berlin; ROBERT JAN VAN PELT 
/ DEBORAH DWORK, AUSCHWITZ. 1270 TO THE PRESENT (1996); JONATHAN S. FOER, EVERYTHING IS 
ILLUMINATED (2002).  
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argued that these crimes were such that punishment would be inevitable. This 
might give rise to legal problems, but these crimes ought to be dealt with to the 
extent possible by means of ordinary criminal procedure.  
 
Hannah Arendt’s controversial work, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality 
of Evil, offers answers to the two questions adumbrated that follow the second line 
of reasoning. In her opinion, the Holocaust presented us with a new type of evil 
and a new type of crime, unprecedented in history and related to totalitarianism as 
a modern phenomenon.3 Since any new act entering into the history of humanity 
can become a part of its history, it is of the greatest importance that it be evaluated 
not only from a historical and moral perspective, but also from a legal perspective. 
For this reason, Arendt is both keenly interested in and supportive of the trials 
against the Nazi criminals. She even becomes involved – to some extent - in the 
debate over the legal basis of these trials, when, as a reporter for The New Yorker, 
she covered the trial against Nazi-officer Adolf Eichmann, conducted in Jerusalem 
in the early 1960’s. In her coverage of that trial, she emphasized the novelty both of 
the crime and the criminal. According to her, ‘the actual horror of Auschwitz ... is of 
a different nature from all the atrocities of the past’.4  
 
In this article, I aim first to provide some background information concerning the 
trial and its protagonist. Thereafter, I will briefly turn to the reasons as to why 
Arendt’s report aroused such controversy. Then, I will take up several legal 
problems that had to be overcome at the International Military Tribunal’s 
proceedings at Nuremberg (in short, the Nuremberg Trial). Finally, I will discuss 
Arendt’s legal assessment of the Jerusalem trial. In the course of the discussion, an 
important ambivalence in her assessment will emerge. This ambivalence turns on 
her interpretation of the Jerusalem court’s competence on the basis of territoriality 
on the one hand and her view on ‘crimes against humanity’ as a crime to be 
adjudicated only by an International Criminal Court on the other.  
 
B. ‘The specialist’ 
 
On Monday, the 23 May 1960, Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben Gurion made an 
important announcement in the Knesset in Jerusalem: the war criminal Adolf 
Eichmann, having eluded capture over a long period of time, had been kidnapped 
in Argentina by the Israeli secret service, the Mossad on the 11 May; he was secretly 
                                                 
 3 As examined in: THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1966) (ORIG. AS: ELEMENTE UND URSPRÜNGE 
TOTALER HERRSCHAFT) (1958).  
 4 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM. A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 267 (1992) (ORIG. 
1963). 
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transferred to Israel on the 22 May and would soon be standing trial for his role in 
the Holocaust.5 
 
Despite his relatively low rank as SS-Obersturmbannführer, Eichmann had long been 
considered to be among the most important organizers of the genocide of the Jews. 
His name circulated several times during preparations for the Nuremberg Trial. 
Eichmann, however, had been able to hide from the Allied forces, later finding safe 
haven in Argentina, where he began a new life under the name of Ricardo Klement. 
Now he would be required to account for his acts in a Jerusalem courthouse. 
Eichmann’s trial, also known as ‘trial 40/61’,6 commenced on the 11 April 1961; 
after several hearings of very emotional testimony, the trial was concluded in 
December 1961 with the prosecutor’s closing statement, the defence’s plea, and the 
court’s judgment. Eichmann was found guilty on several counts, e.g., of crimes 
against the Jewish People, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Under the 
1950 Israeli ‘Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act’, such crimes were 
punishable by death. Eichmann was indeed sentenced to death. Upon his appeal, 
his verdict was confirmed by the Israeli Supreme Court, and he was hanged on the 
30 May 1962.  
 
The trial would today be called a ‘media event’. Arendt formed part of a large 
group of the press, the presence of which was one of the reasons of public 
awareness and discussion of the trial. In addition, television had entered people’s 
lives and pictures of the trial were broadcast. Less well known, was the fact that all 
the hearings before the court were filmed.7 A few years ago, a film based on these 
tapes, entitled ‘The Specialist’, was released. This film, lasting two hours, consists of 
some telling ‘fragments’ of the Eichmann Trial.8 To be able to watch these 
‘highlights’ after so many years is fascinating and an interesting story on the 
making of this film can be told. The recordings made during the trial were stored 
and then forgotten. When they re-emerged after many years, their condition had 
seriously deteriorated. Large parts were beyond restoration, while other parts were 
seriously damaged requiring restoration costing considerable amounts of time, 
energy and money. That restoration was initiated by Steven Spielberg Jewish Film 
                                                 
 5 For the precise background, see, for example, Annette Wieviorka, Die Entstehung des Zeugen, in: 
HANNAH ARENDT REVISITED. ‘EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM’ UND DIE FOLGEN 140 (G. SMITH, ED., 2000).  
6 This then is the title of the report of the ‘Dutch journalist’ (cf., H. Arendt, note 4, 282): HARRY MULISCH, 
DE ZAAK 40/61 (1961). 
7 See Wieviorka (note 5), 149. 
8  EMIL FACKENHEIM, TO MEND THE WORLD 237 (1982), comments on and rejects Arendt’s thesis of the 
banality of evil as a result of those clips.  
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Archives.9 Subsequently, Sivan and Brauman took upon themselves the task of 
editing the material in the form of a film. In selecting and putting together the 
material, they, remarkably, decided to follow Arendt’s book on Eichmann. By 
doing so, they opted for what was not only at the time of the trial itself, 10 but even 
today, a highly controversial perspective.11 Arendt’s portrayal of the trial was by no 
means an unbiased report. In fact, it was problematical for no fewer than three 
reasons, even if we disregard the ‘tenor’ of the book. And this itself was seen by 
many as highly inappropriate.12 
 
First, the central function of criminal proceedings, according to Arendt, consists in 
determining the criminal culpability of the suspect and not in giving expression to 
the severe suffering of the victims, unless the latter is instrumental to the main aim 
of the trial. The failure to recognize this pervaded, according to Arendt, the whole 
trial. During the hearings, she ascertained a shift from a focus on Eichmann to a 
focus on the victims. The use of criminal procedure for goals other than establishing 
criminal responsibility, such as the moral recognition of the victim’s misery or 
education of the young,13 will necessarily have an adverse effect on its credibility. 
Moreover, the State of Israel in Arendt’s view had a political agenda in conducting 
this trial. According to some in the political leadership, notably Ben Gurion, the 
Eichmann trial was intended to contribute significantly to strengthening both the 
identity of Israel’s people and the legitimacy of the young state vis-à-vis the outside 
world. By extensively demonstrating the suffering of Jewish victims, the trial would 
cause people to realize that the decision to establish a Jewish state was justified.14  
 
                                                 
9 Not to be confused with the ‘Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation’, which was founded 
by Spielberg after filming Schindler’s List with an aim of capturing Holocaust survivors’ testimonies on 
film, see http://www.vhf.org/. 
 10 This report led to a split between Arendt and Gershom Scholem, see, Stéphane Mosès, Das Recht zu 
urteilen: Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem und der Eichmann-Prozess, in: GARRY SMITH (note 5), 78. On the 
‘civil war’ among intellectuals in New York, which was caused by Arendt’s report, see, for example, 
Anthony Grafton, Arendt und Eichmann am Esstisch, in: G. SMITH (note 5), 57.  
 11 DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 592-3 
(2nd ED., 1996). 
 12 The element that was seen as most disturbing was Arendt’s evil qualification of Leo Baeck, president 
of the Berlin Jewish Council, as ‘Jewish Führer’, a qualification she deleted in later editions of her book, 
ARENDT (note 4), 119.  
 13 Tuija Parvikko, Positivists versus Moralists. The Eichmann Trial and International Law, FINNISH YEARBOOK 
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 223, 233 (2000).  
 14 Id., 235. 
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These instrumental uses of the trial, however, would create the real danger, 
according to Arendt, of it becoming a show trial.15 In Arendt’s rendering of the trial, 
Chief Prosecutor Hausner, in his eagerness to orchestrate the entire trial with an eye 
to these goals, is portrayed as the Israeli political leadership’s puppet. His opening 
words are telling: ”As I stand before you, Judges of Israel, to lead the prosecution of 
Adolf Eichmann, I do not stand alone. With me, in this place and in this hour, stand 
six million accusers.”16 By presenting the state of Israel as the representative of the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust, possibly even other audiences were addressed and 
the following messages sent: “Jewish community abroad, be sure that that the fate 
of the Jewish community as such is safeguarded by the State of Israel’; ‘State of 
Germany, be very generous in paying compensation money.”17 Arendt is more than 
pleased that the presiding judges were much keener on sticking to their task. She 
comments positively on the work of Judges Raveh and Landau,18 both of whom 
concentrated on the accused and on the criminal charges. With her critical stance 
towards the prosecuting State of Israel, Arendt did not make herself popular and 
she was accused of having little compassion for the victims.  
 
Second, Arendt’s report was also controversial in another respect. The Eichmann 
Trial differed from the Nuremberg Trial in its emphasis on the Jewish suffering 
during the Holocaust. But this inevitably brought also another element to the fore, 
namely, the problem of the so-called Jewish Councils, the administrative bodies 
created by the Nazis in order to communicate with the Jewish population. Here, 
too, Arendt gives the impression of having not taken the side of the victims. 
Instead, she blurred the distinction between perpetrators and victims. In her 
rendering of the testimony given during the hearings, she suggests that these 
councils did not act unconditionally in the interest of the population but allowed 
themselves to some degree to be misused by the Nazis as an extension of their 
apparatus of destruction.19 By acting as part of the Nazi bureaucracy, these councils 
                                                 
 15 See ARENDT (note 4), 9-10.  
 16 GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 323 (1966).  
 17 RICHARD WOLIN, HEIDEGGER’S CHILDREN 55 (2001); Amos Elon, Hannah Arendts Exkommunizierung, in: 
SMITH (note 5), 25.  
 18 Because of the German-Jewish descent, compared to the ‘Galician’ Hausner? See: Hannah Arendt / 
Karl Jaspers, Letter of April 13th 1961, in: HANNAH ARENDT / KARL JASPERS. BRIEFWECHSEL 1926-1969 472 
(1985).  
 19 Scholem protests fundamentally, especially against Arendt’s harsh judgement: ‘Ich finde in Ihren 
Darstellungen des jüdischen Verhaltens unter extremen Umstände kein abgewogenes Urteil, .. Ich masse 
mir kein Urteil an. Ich war nicht dabei’, in: Mosès, note 10 above at 79. This is not a minor allegation, as 
Arendt prided herself in understanding political judgments very well, especially in: LECTURES ON 
KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (H. BEINER, ED., 1982).  
412                                                                                               [Vol. 06  No. 02  G E R M A N L A W J O U R N A L
undertook preparatory work for deportations and thus assumed to a certain degree 
a ‘co-operative’ stance vis-à-vis Nazi crimes. Arendt uses the following words to 
speak of this ‘dark side’ of the Jewish annihilation:  
 
“If the Jewish people had really been unorganized and leaderless, there 
would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of 
victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six million 
people.”20  
 
This quotation also reveals another aspect of the Holocaust, underscored time and 
again by Arendt, namely, that a fundamental difference exists between 
antisemitism and the pogroms the Jewish people became ‘accustomed to’ during 
their history on the one hand and modern genocide on the other. In the debate on 
the Holocaust, she defends explicitly the position of ‘functionalism’.21 From 
Hilberg’s classical study The Destruction of the European Jews (1961),22 she learnt 
about the bureaucratic nature of the Holocaust and then stressed the necessity of 
understanding this genocide as a specific possibility of modern society. This 
functionalism evoked and still evokes fierce reactions. In general, it is argued that it 
overestimates the element of bureaucracy on the basis, in particular, of an 
inaccurate description of the Jewish councils’ role. Moreover, it underestimates and 
fails to explain why this genocide targeted the Jews and why it happened in 
Germany. Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners serves as a recent, well-known 
example of the intentionalist school, which stresses antisemitism as the prime 
motive behind the genocide. 
 
Third, and related to the previous point, Arendt’s characterization of the ‘kind’ of 
evil which stood trial in Jerusalem, was also considered to be offensive. Altogether 
different from the prosecutor’s attempts to portray Eichmann as a criminal of 
demonic dimensions, Arendt stresses the ‘normality’ of his character and the 
                                                 
 20 See ARENDT (note 4), 125.  
 21 In summary, functionalists stress the bureaucratic and modern character of the the Holocaust, which is 
than said to have begun by the end of 1941 as a result of the failure of the Nazi deportation and 
emigration policy and the military losses in Russia; Intentionalists argue that the Holocaust was actually 
willed and planned by Hitler from the very beginning of his political career. Functionalism in Arendt 
can already be found in her 1948 text: Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility, e.g., in: COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 273 (LARRY MAY / STANLEY HOFFMAN, EDS., 1981). And in her report of a visit to 
Germany in 1949-1950, now e.g.,in: HANNAH ARENDT, BESUCH IN DEUTSCHLAND (1973). See, for a 
‘functionalist view’ deeply inspired by Arendt, ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 
(1993). 
 22 Apart from that, Hilberg considered his life work ruined by Arendt’s careless use of it, see Gary Smith, 
Einsicht aus falscher Distanz, in: SMITH (note 5), 7.  
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‘banality’ of his evil.23 In this way, she seems not only to have distanced herself 
from her previous views on radical evil24 but also to give a quite implausible 
account of Eichmann. She finds as one of the defendant’s most striking aspects the 
fact that he was certainly not an antisemitic monster or a sadist unusually perverse 
in character, but rather a clown,25 presenting himself as someone who simply 
obeyed orders, which he viewed as part of the legal system of his country. He 
executed his tasks zealously and with ambition. Consequently, he complained 
about his low-ranking position of Obersturmbannführer, which fell far short, he 
believed, of what he deserved. Holding this modest rank, he did not thus consider 
himself to be in a position to evaluate the political goals set by his superiors, 
certainly not following the formal decision of the élite of the Reich to adopt the 
Endlösung at the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942.26 Precisely this 
unwillingness and inability to make decisions autonomously, which Arendt coins 
as his inauthenticity,27 rendered Eichmann extremely fit for the tasks he was 
charged with. It was telling, Arendt writes, that Eichmann remembered all the 
decisive moments in his career, but made frequent mistakes about essential 
developments of the war and with respect to important steps regarding the 
destruction of the Jews. Thus, she locates Eichmann’s evil not in the depth of his 
motives, but rather in the lack of profundity, in his shallowness, in his clichés:  
 
“Eichmann was not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been 
farther from his mind than to determine with Richard III ‘to prove a 
villain’. … He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what 
he was doing. ... It was sheer thoughtlessness - something by no means 
identical with stupidity - that predisposed him to become one of the 
greatest criminals of that period.” 
 
Arendt instructs us to find here ‘the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-
defying  
                                                 
 23 See, also, Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Letter of October 19th 1946 and Letter of December 17th 1946 
(note 18) 99, 106.  
 24 See Richard Bernstein, Did Hannah Arendt Change her Mind? From Radical Evil to the Banality of Evil, in: 
Hannah Arendt. Twenty Years Later 127 (JEROME KOHN / LARRY MAY, EDS., 1996).  
 25 See ARENDT (note 4), 54. 
 26 See ARENDT (note 4), 114. See, also, http://www.ghwk.de. 
 27 See Avishai Margalit / Gabriel Motzkin, Anstifter und Vollstrecker: Hannah Arendts Authentizitätsbegriff 
als Kriterium zur Beurteilung Adolf Eichmanns, in: SMITH (note 5), 202; Thomas Mertens, Arendt’s Judgment 
and Eichmann’s Evil, FINNISH YEARBOOK OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 2 58 (1998). 
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banality of evil’.28 Although her thesis on banality was never meant as a description 
of Eichmann’s crimes, but rather as a characterization of his personality, many were 
nevertheless offended by this qualification.29 Still, as we shall see, this thesis played 
an important role in Arendt’s effort to understand the full import of the crimes 
committed by Eichmann and the Nazis.  
 
C. The Nuremberg Trial 
 
There is little doubt that the Eichmann Trial would not have taken place without 
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The Eichmann Trial derives its 
international legitimacy from the precedent set by the trial of leading figures from 
the Nazi regime.30 This trial was unique, first of all, for the reason that trying these 
figures was far from obvious. During the war, the allies conducted research on the 
war crimes committed by the Axis-powers, and in that context, as would become 
clear later, a great deal of information on what had happened in Eastern Europe 
became available. For a number of reasons, however, the revelations about killings 
had not been given much publicity and no attempts were made, when possible, to 
stop the genocide. Why no efforts were made is far from obvious. Some believe that 
the authorities may have been concerned about exaggerating the extent of the 
German atrocities, as during the First World War. It was suggested, too, that the 
allied forces had concentrated on the war effort: the sooner the war was over, the 
sooner these crimes would cease. One can only hope that moral indifference did not 
play a role here.31  
 
These investigations on war crimes and on what later became known as crimes 
against humanity were not conducted with an eye to preparation for possible post-
war trials. Churchill’s well-known announcement, on 25 October 1941, that 
‘retribution for these (German) crimes’ takes ‘its place among the major purposes of 
the war’, need not be understood as a full commitment to a legal proceeding with 
all the rights accorded to the defendants. Some deep reluctance to undertake such a 
trial existed, firstly, owing to the disappointing experiences after the First World 
War. After Germany’s defeat, there were voices calling for an international tribunal 
                                                 
 28 See ARENDT (note 4), 252, 287-8 (emphasis in the original). 
 29 See, also, PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE 134 (1999).  
 30 The existence of the Nuremberg Trials may give the impression that a large part of the crimes 
committed by the Nazi regime and during the war has been prosecuted. This is not the case. Only a 
limited number of ‘big fish’ have been tried, but in many cases there has not been a legal 
‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, see, for example, FRIEDRICH JÖRG, FREISPRUCH FÜR DIE NAZI-JUSTIZ (1983); 
TIM BOWDER, BLIND EYE TO MURDER (2nd ED., 1995) (ORIG. 1981).  
 31 See, also, NOVICK (note 29), 54-58.  
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with the slogan ‘Hang the Kaiser!’. The Dutch government refused, however, to 
extradite the Kaiser, who had found refuge in the Netherlands. The trials after the 
war of other Germans accused of war crimes after the war were problematic, too. 
Weimar Germany refused to extradite the would-be defendants, and when their 
trial was finally handed over to German courts, the results were foreseeable.32 
Churchill, responding in effect to these futile efforts, thus formulated a plan to 
arrest and execute fifty prominent Nazis, claiming that their guilt was so great as to 
reach beyond ordinary legal procedures. The destiny of vanquished Nazi-leaders 
ought to be, as far as Churchill was concerned, a political issue, not a legal one, 
where the obstacles were all too familiar.33 Opinions in the United States were 
mixed: some supported the British plan, while others opted for a fair trial. In the 
end, the allied forces took the latter option, for Stalin, too – albeit for totally 
different reasons – supported a trial. He, after all, had been used to getting rid of 
political opponents through show trials.  
 
Second, then, this trial was unique owing to the legal obstacles that had to be 
overcome. The first obstacle was the need to establish a legal basis. The London 
Charter, which was drafted by the Allies on 8 August 1945, was an important 
milestone in this context, providing the basis for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over 
(war-) criminals whose crimes were not limited to any specific territory. The 
tribunal was to have competence to hear the following charges: conducting a war of 
aggression, i.e., crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This 
was, of course, only a start in solving the legal problems.  Before World War II there 
was no consensus in international law as to the definitions of any of these crimes. 
Thus, an obvious reproach could be made: through these charges, conduct that was 
not punishable at the time it took place, was now made punishable retroactively.  
This was thus a violation of one of the most important principles of the rule of law, 
nulla poena sine lege. It was by no means clear that Germany’s having undertaken an 
offensive war by attacking Poland in September 1939 was unlawful under positive 
international law. Perhaps one could refer here to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty, 
but no consensus among scholars existed with respect to its status. The legal 
theorist Carl Schmitt, for instance, did not consider the treaty as a part of a 
genuinely international legal order, but rather as a part of Britain’s imperialist 
foreign policy.34 More of a consensus existed with respect to what ought legally be 
considered ‘war crimes’. In this context, the Allies and later on the Tribunal itself, 
                                                 
 32 See the Versailles Treaty, Par. 227-9; BOWDER (note 30), 17-19; GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY. THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 225-6 (2000).  
 33 See ROBERTSON, id., 211; JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 159 (1964).  
 34 Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte (1939), in: 
STAAT, GROSSRAUM, NOMOS: ARBEITEN AUS DEN JAHREN 1916-1969 287 (GÜNTHER MASCHKE, ED., 1995).  
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could refer to The Hague Conventions that had been concluded with broad 
approval in the international legal community at the end of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. With respect to ‘war crimes’ and to the disputed ‘crime of 
aggression’, however, the credibility of the Allied accusations was at stake. Both 
with respect to ‘crimes of aggression’ and to ‘war crimes’ the argumentation of tu 
quoque applied.   The Soviet Union’s invasion in Poland in 1939 and in Finland, and 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty could easily be placed under the first crime and the 
Allied bombardments of open cities without any military necessity,35 both with and 
without atomic weapons, under the second crime. With respect to these two 
indictments, the countries that supported the Charter and initiated the trial could 
easily be accused of hypocrisy.  
 
Clearly, the Charter’s most innovative aspect was its penalizing of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ in an effort to target the genocide committed by the Nazis before and 
especially during the war, yet hardly connected with their war effort.36 The 
historical basis for this offense was modest.37 Still, it was the least controversial of 
the counts in the indictment. Article 6, paragraph c, describes crimes against 
humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, 
or persecution on political, racial or religious ground in execution of or in 
connection with any crime, within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”.38  
 
Third and last, the Nuremberg Trial was unique in removing two important 
obstacles for convicting Nazi criminals, originating in positivist legal theory.39 
Importantly, in Nuremberg, appeals to the ‘acts of state’ doctrine and to the related 
doctrine of state immunity were rejected. These doctrines stem from the idea that 
one sovereign state cannot judge acts of other sovereign states: par in parem non 
                                                 
 35 Similarly, recently, for example, JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (note 1), 98-100, drawing on 
MICHAEL WALZER’s classic JUST AND UNJUST WARS (2nd ED., 1992) (ORIG. 1977). 
 36 In a way, the war only provided the context in which the genocide became possible: ‘a crime that 
could not be explained by any utilitarian purpose,’ ARENDT (note 4), 275.  
 37 Already before the Second World War, there were attempts, predominantly by Robert Lemkin, to 
codify the crime of genocide. See SAMANTHA POWERS, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE 
OF GENOCIDE (2002) and its review by Brian Urquhart, Shameful Neglect,12 7 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
BOOKS 49 (2002). See, also, Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Politics of Memory/Erinnerungspolitik and the Use 
and Propriety of Law in the Process of Memory Construction, 14 LAW AND CRITIQUE 309 (2003). 
 38 See, for example, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm. 
 39 Stanley L. Paulson, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg,in 4 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 132 
(1974). 
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habet jurisdictionem. Since, in international law, a vertical relation between the 
sovereign and its subject is lacking, no state can impose criminal sentences on the 
representative authorities of another state. This reasoning is emphatically rejected 
in Article 7 of the Charter: ‘The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of 
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered 
as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment’. In his opening 
address, the chief prosecutor added that it is a fiction to assume that states commit 
crimes: crimes are only committed by individuals.40  
 
The second obstacle is removed by Article 9, which rejects as a justification the 
appeal to superior orders: ‘The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to the order 
of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may 
be considered in mitigation of punishment…’. According to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, this is only an extension of what is widely accepted in the martial law and 
criminal law of all civilized nations. Orders that are evidently criminal do not have 
to be obeyed. Criminal acts committed while obeying criminal orders can be 
prosecuted unless the defendant could not have known the criminal nature of the 
orders or unless he was compelled to comply. In 1961, the appeal to ‘superior 
orders’ constituted an important element in Eichmann’s defence. He argued that he 
had only carried out decisions taken by his superiors and therefore could not be 
held criminally accountable for the outcome of those actions that his superiors had 
set in motion.  
 
D. The Trial in Jerusalem 
 
The Nuremberg Trial can be, and was in fact, severely criticized, and on several 
different grounds: owing to the retroactivity of the statutes applied, owing to the 
application of a double standard and, of course, owing in general to the fact that 
they could easily enough be regarded as instances of victor’s justice. 
Notwithstanding these objections, however, there exists a broad consensus to the 
effect that the Charter and the Trial made a very important contribution to the 
development of international criminal law and represented, at the same time, a 
fundamental challenge to the doctrine of state sovereignty. Integrating the ‘crimes 
against humanity’ principle into the Charter, convicting on the basis of this 
principle and setting the doctrines of state immunity and superior orders aside, 
have been extremely important. Still, genocide of the European Jewry, though it 
was an important reason for establishing the International Military Tribunal, did 
not play a predominant role in the trial. Julius Streicher, the publisher of the 
antisemitic ‘Der Stürmer’, was the only person convicted solely for ‘crimes against 
                                                 
 40 See ROBERTSON (note 32), 218. 
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humanity’. Where the other defendants were concerned, a conviction for this 
particular crime was linked as far as possible to convictions for the other charges. 
Thus, this aspect of ‘crimes against humanity’ remained underdeveloped at 
Nuremberg. It was not until the trial in Jerusalem that perpetrators and victims of 
the Holocaust faced each other. Only then did the crimes committed against the 
Jewish people and other ethnic groups play a central role and only then did the 
question of the exact nature of this crime arise.  
 
In her rendering of the trial, Arendt considers this question in detail, arguing that 
the court answered it wrongly. Before doing so, however, she discusses other legal 
problems in relation to the trial. I will argue that Arendt’s approach to these 
objections leads her into an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the nature of the crime at 
stake. The objections raised were in part similar to those raised at the Nuremberg 
Trial.  With respect to Eichmann, too, the law was said to have been introduced by 
a victor’s court with retroactive effect.  Eichmann was thus accused of having 
committed acts that were not criminal at the time committed or were not 
foreseeably criminal in nature. In discussing this first set of objections, Arendt does 
not merely mention the fact that the Jerusalem court can legitimately refer to what 
the Nuremberg judges said and consider it as a valid precedent. Instead, she 
addresses this objection substantially and grants that ‘Nuremberg’, in a certain 
sense, did indeed violate the nulla poena principle. Although the introduction of the 
crimes in the 1945 London Charter was not altogether without a basis in law, the 
principle nulla poena was formally violated where crimes against peace and war 
crimes are concerned. A fortiori for ‘crimes against humanity’. In Arendt’s view, 
however, especially with regard to this last issue, the principle of nulla poena was 
violated only in a formal sense, not in the far more important, material sense. The 
nulla poena principle, she argues, applies only to crimes that the legislator could 
reasonably be expected to have foreseen. The crime of the Holocaust, however, was 
a new crime, one without any precedent. Here the demand for justice cannot be 
ignored out of deference to considerations of temporality and retroactivity. The 
introduction of a new law, be it in the London Charter, or in the earlier-mentioned 
Israeli ‘Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law’, is, she argues, justified.41 
The nulla poena principle is not to be used as a shield to ward off the punishing of 
acts that are clearly and obviously criminal.  
There was, however, also a second specific set of objections raised against the 
Eichmann trial. These objections concerned the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem court 
in at least two respects. Firstly, it was argued that a court in Jerusalem, consisting 
solely of Jewish judges, could not possibly be impartial when focusing, in the 
                                                 
 41 See ARENDT (note 4), 254; See, also, Seyla Benhabib, Identität, Perspektive und Erzählung in Hannah 
Arendts ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’, in: SMITH (note 5), 109.  
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Eichmann case, on the suffering of Jews before and especially during World War II. 
According to Arendt, there is not much validity to this objection. Judges should of 
course be impartial, but that requirement does not mean that judges are not 
allowed to have sympathy for the victims of the crime or that they cannot express 
disapproval of a crime. Impartiality concerns the judge’s ability to take an 
unprejudiced position on questions of guilt or innocence. It is not about avoiding a 
choice between perpetrator and victim.  
 
The second aspect of the objection against the Jerusalem court’s competence goes 
deeper. It concerns the State of Israel. The objection runs as follows: A defendant 
cannot possibly be held accountable by a court that is constituted after the crimes 
have taken place, and constituted by a state that did not exist at that time. This 
objection is, of course, closely related to the nulla poena objection, but runs 
differently. The argument has it that any newly established court will have only 
prospective jurisdiction and cannot therefore preside over criminal cases that took 
place before the court was constituted. A recent example of the application and 
relevance of this rule is found in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which recently came into force.42 This challenge to the jurisdiction 
of the Jerusalem court provoked considerable discussion. In defence of the court’s 
jurisdiction, some argued in favor of the ‘passive personality’ principle. The State of 
Israel’s right to prosecute and punish would then stem from its claim to stand in 
the place of the victims, justified by the relation between this state and these 
victims. According to Arendt, this position can be recognized in Hausner’s earlier-
mentioned opening speech, in which he claims to be acting on behalf of millions of 
victims. Arendt, however, is not very satisfied with this way of answering the 
objection. According to this reasoning, she argues, criminal proceedings would 
follow from the need for revenge, either on the part of the victims or their 
substitutes, while they ought to stem from the requirements of justice. A criminal 
trial is not a civil case; it is not conducted owing to the harm done to a victim, but 
because a legal norm of the community has been violated.43  
 
For these and related reasons, ‘universal jurisdiction’ was invoked by others in 
replying to the challenge of the Jerusalem court’s jurisdiction. In this connection, 
the alleged similarity between ‘crimes against humanity’ and the well-known 
‘crime of piracy’ was underlined, for in both cases the criminal is said to be an 
‘enemy of the human species’. Any legal system would be competent to commence 
                                                 
 42 The Rome Statute determines in its article 11: ‘The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of this Statute’; and in article 24: ‘No person shall be criminally 
responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute’.  
 43 See ARENDT (note 4), 261. 
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criminal proceedings. This line of reasoning, too, falls short of the mark, Arendt 
argues. There exists only an apparent analogy.  That is that ‘universal’ jurisdiction 
was granted over the crime of piracy not so much because the pirate is an enemy of 
humanity, but because the crime is committed on the open sea, where the 
territoriality principle has no application. A pirate, taking advantage of the absence 
of national law, avoids the need to obey any flag. It can hardly be argued that 
Eichmann committed his crimes in the absence of national law. Here the problem 
resides, rather, in the fact that the crime of genocide was committed by a criminal 
state under the flag of its legal system.44 
 
E. Territoriality 
 
This still leaves the problem of the court’s competence according to Arendt very 
much unresolved. In her attempt to solve it, Arendt, astonishingly, seems to return 
to the territoriality principle as endorsed in Nuremberg. It, however, comes at a 
price. Based on the Preamble to the London Charter, the International Military 
Tribunal was empowered to prosecute those criminals whose crimes could not be 
traced to any specific territory, thus, to any specific jurisdiction. Those who 
committed crimes in a specific territory could be prosecuted by national courts. On 
this basis, many successor trials to the Nuremberg Trial took place in different 
countries, and Arendt seems to conceive of the Eichmann Trial as ‘just’ one of them. 
This return to the territoriality principle, however, is puzzling and inconsistent. The 
whole issue of the court’s jurisdiction was raised because the State of Israel did not 
exist when the crimes were committed, and it therefore seems obvious that no 
crimes took place on its ‘territory’. Arendt’s answer to this difficulty seems only to 
exacerbate the problem. As she argues, ‘territoriality’ should not be seen primarily 
as a geographical concept but as a political one. This concept refers not so much to a 
strip of land as to the ‘space’ between the members of a group of people, united by 
a common language, heritage, religion, history, and by common customs and laws. 
The State of Israel would never have been brought into existence, she rightly 
argues, without the prior existence of a certain unity between the members of the 
Jewish People (‘prior to the seizure of its old territory’),45 despite many centuries of 
the diaspora. According to this line of reasoning, the Eichmann Trial was, indeed, a 
successor trial to the Nuremberg Trial, and it would then also correspond to the 
wording of the 1948 Genocide Convention,46 signed by Israel and quoted by 
                                                 
 44 Id., 261-2. See, also, Moishe Postone, Hannah Arendts ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’: Die unaufgelöste Antinomie 
von Universalität und Besonderem, in SMITH (note 5), 273.  
 45 See ARENDT (note 4), 263. 
 46 Article 6 reads: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall 
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such 
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Arendt. The only remaining difficulty in this case would then be the fact that the 
defendant was not properly arrested and extradited. Whereas kidnapping was, 
indeed, a violation of international law, there was justification aplenty. Argentina 
was renowned for refusing to extradite criminals. Eichmann was stateless, and the 
only alternative to kidnapping was to have Israeli agents execute Eichmann in the 
streets of Buenos Aires.47 
 
Despite this apparently plausible reasoning, returning to the territoriality principle 
is highly questionable. Firstly, to call this prior unity of the Jews ‘territorial’ in the 
legal sense seems odd and brings Arendt’s argument all too close to the justification 
she rejected earlier, namely, that of Hausner’s passive personality principle. Does 
she really consider Israel to be representing the Jewish victims of ‘crimes against 
humanity’? Does she really defend the view that it represents all Jews, regardless of 
where they actually ‘inhabit’ the world and regardless of their citizenship? 
Considering territoriality as a ‘specific in-between space’ that depends on heritage, 
language and customs, flies in the face of a political definition of citizenship and 
seems to endorse an ‘ethnic’ definition, in which all ethnic Jews are seen as 
potential citizens of Israel.48 If Arendt indeed argued in this vein and gave priority 
to ‘nature’ over ‘will’, then her answer to the problem of the court’s competence 
could not be seen as differing much from the ‘passive-personality principle’49 
according to which relatives have the right to demand compensation in the name of 
absent victims.  
 
According to Arendt, such a manner of justifying the court’s competence seriously 
threatens the way ‘crimes against humanity’ ought properly to be understood. In 
her eyes, this crime, precisely because it is ‘against humanity’, transcends all 
territorial limits. Thus, on the one hand, she criticizes the court for not taking 
seriously enough the fact that it was addressing a crime totally new in character, 
namely, the crime of genocide - the court wrongly interpreted Eichmann’s crime 
not as a crime against humanity but as a crime against the Jewish nation. On the 
other hand, she seems however to be defending the Jerusalem court’s jurisdiction 
on grounds of territoriality. Interpreting Eichmann’s crime according to the 
standards of territoriality would, however, imply a Jewish ‘appropriation’ of this 
                                                                                                                             
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which 
shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’ 
 47 See ARENDT (note 4), 263-5. 
48 Similarly Benhabib (note 41), 110.  
49 See ARENDT (note 4), 260. 
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crime, which Arendt rejects on the ground that this would deny the unique 
character of what happened during the Holocaust. 
 
This ambivalence can only be resolved by regarding as Arendt’s most important 
view, her thesis that the crime of the Holocaust contained something absolutely 
unprecedented. If we follow this line of reasoning in Arendt’s work and discount 
her remarks on the territoriality principle, her views become consistent.  For 
example, where she argues that the legal community - not only that of Israel but 
that of humanity as a whole - was empty handed, it lacked both the categories and 
the institutions to deal with this new crime. According to Arendt, the problems she 
identifies in ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’ stem from an improper understanding, 
especially on the part of the Jerusalem court, of the nature of the crime it had before 
it. This court had the difficult task of judging a crime without precedent and it 
failed in part, owing to its use of obsolete categories and not particularly relevant 
historical experience. The judges should have realized that, in Kant’s language of 
the Critique of Judgement, they were confronted with a ‘particular’ for which the 
‘general’ did not yet exist. As we have seen, however, a similar reproach can be 
made with regard to Arendt herself. 
 
Obviously, the question as to the ‘nature’ of the ‘crime against humanity’ arose only 
in Jerusalem as such a pressing issue. In Nuremberg, the Jews were merely present 
as spectators and victims in connection with the ‘Kriegsschuldfrage’ and ‘war crimes’ 
playing a predominant role. This gave to the issue of ‘crimes against humanity’ 
only a limited importance.50 In the Eichmann Trial, however, the question of what 
had actually happened to the Jews had to be decided. In Arendt’s opinion, this 
question was answered wrongly. Many argued that this was not the 
‘unprecedented crime of genocide’, but rather a repetition, albeit it on a larger scale, 
of the old crime of anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism, of discrimination, expulsion 
and pogrom. Arendt saw this misunderstanding as being at the root of all the 
mistakes and shortcomings of the Jerusalem Trial. The Holocaust was a crime 
against humanity committed on the body of the Jewish people for historical reasons 
alone. The choice of the victims, not the nature of the crime, is drawn from the long 
history of hate directed at the Jews.51 However, by reading Eichmann’s crimes from 
this historical perspective, the qualitative difference between discrimination and 
expulsion on the one hand and genocide on the other, is overlooked. From a 
historical perspective, this was understandable. During the whole of recorded 
history, Jews have been subject to expulsion and murder. The Nuremberg 1935 
racial statutes were recognized by other states as part of Germany’s positive law, 
                                                 
 50 See SHKLAR (note 33), 170. 
 51 See ARENDT (note 4), 269. 
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and thus appeared as nothing new. Discriminating against the Jews was all too 
familiar, and there were many historical precedents for what was apparently going 
on in Germany.  
 
According to Arendt, however, those precedents should not have prevented the 
court from acknowledging the qualitatively new ‘nature’ of the Nazi crimes. 
Denying the right to exist to a whole group of people on grounds of ethnicity is a 
wholly new phenomenon distinct from historical events like expulsion and 
pogrom. Genocide constituted the totally new attack on the human status of 
diversity and plurality, without which the concept ‘humanity’ would be senseless.52 
 
If the court had sufficiently acknowledged this, it would have appreciated that it 
had no competence in this case: neither the passive personality principle, nor a 
traditional understanding of the universal jurisdiction principle, nor - contra 
Arendt - any territoriality principle, could solve the jurisdictional problem. Only a 
court that could genuinely claim to represent the whole of humanity, and would act 
on the basis of a new understanding of the import of ‘universal jurisdiction’, would 
have been competent to judge Eichmann. Therefore, Arendt in the end agrees with 
her former teacher Jaspers. It would have been better if the Jerusalem court, after 
hearing the case, had declared itself to be without competence and the ‘Nazis and 
Nazi Collaborators Law’ to be without application. It should then have asked the 
United Nations to establish for this case an International Criminal Court, for ‘the 
very monstrousness of the events is “minimized” before a tribunal which 
represents one nation only’.53 Only such a scenario, in her eyes, would have 
promoted the development of the new legal category of ‘humanity’ and the 
transformation of existing legal orders and concepts.54 
 
This is, of course, not what happened. Eichmann was convicted neither for 
attacking and violating the human condition of plurality, nor for the monstrous 
claim that certain people have the right to determine who should and who should 
not inhabit this Earth. This was an unforgivable crime against human nature, or, in 
Arendt’s words, against ‘natality’ qua the unique human ability to make a new start 
in this world over and over again.55 She does not, however, fully disagree with the 
outcome. She, too, thinks that a single sentence would have been appropriate here; 
                                                 
 52 Id., 269; Benhabib (note 41), 111: ‘den Genozid an einem Volk allein aus dem Grund, weil es in dieser 
spezifischen Gestalt als eine von vielen Möglichkeiten der ‘menschlichen Vielfalt’ auf der Erde existiert’.  
53 ARENDT (note 4), 270. 
54 See Postone (note 44), 275. 
55 See WOLIN (note 17), 43. 
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capital punishment. Those who execute a policy of unwillingness to share the earth 
with others and who want to determine who can and who cannot inhabit this earth 
cannot expect others to want to share it with them.56 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 See ARENDT (note 4), 270. 
